Patients with selective deficits in the naming and comprehension of animals, plants, and artifacts have been reported. These descriptions of specific semantic category deficits have contributed substantially to the understanding of the architecture of semantic representations. Objective: This study sought to further understanding of the organization of the semantic system by demonstrating that another semantic category, knowledge of the human body, may be selectively preserved. Methods: The performance of a patient with semantic dementia was compared with the performance of healthy controls on a variety of tasks assessing distinct types of body representations, including the body schema, body image, and body structural description. Results: Despite substantial deficits on tasks involving language and knowledge of the world generally, the patient performed normally on all tests of body knowledge except body part naming; even in this naming task, however, her performance with body parts was significantly better than on artifacts. Conclusions: The demonstration that body knowledge may be preserved despite substantial semantic deficits involving other types of semantic information argues that body knowledge is a distinct and dissociable semantic category. These data are interpreted as support for a model of semantics that proposes that knowledge is distributed across different cortical regions reflecting the manner in which the information was acquired.
Semantic memory is the component of the mental architecture that supports our knowledge of the world. As Kintsch 1 explains, "Semantic memory is our whole-world knowledge-including what we know about robins, what to do in a restaurant, and the history of the Civil War." In recent years, the organization of the semantic system has been a principal focus of research in cognitive neuroscience. Whereas work with normal subjects has led many investigators to postulate that the semantic system is a single store of knowledge in an abstract format, investigations of subjects with brain lesions have revealed striking dissociations in semantic stores that have important theoretical implications. For example, Warrington and Shallice 2 reported on four patients who had relatively selective semantic deficits as a consequence of herpes simplex encephalitis. One patient (J.B.R.) was impaired on naming and comprehension tasks with living things but performed well with nonliving things. Noting that patients with a greater impairment in the naming and comprehension of nonliving as compared with living things had previously been described, 3 these investigators argued that this effect could not be attributed to task difficulty or the general vulnerability of certain semantic categories. Subsequent to this seminal observation, a substantial number of patients with specific and restricted semantic deficits have been reported. [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] Although patients with selective deficits in 11 or preservation of 12 body knowledge have occasionally been reported, the extent to which body knowledge is distinct from other semantic domains has received relatively little attention. We report on a patient with semantic dementia, a variant of frontotemporal dementia in which dysfunction of the anterior temporal lobes is particularly prominent. 13 Our patient performed poorly on a wide range of tasks assessing semantic knowledge yet performed normally on an extensive battery of tasks assessing what we argue are three distinct types of body representations. [14] [15] [16] In conjunction with previous investigations, we suggest that these data provide strong support for the claim that body knowledge represents a discrete and dissociable semantic domain.
Patient description. The patient is a universityeducated woman who began to experience difficulties with language in her late 50s. She stated that she had difficulty comprehending speech and written text and that she had difficulty with word finding, resulting in a loss of precision in her speech. This problem slowly progressed over 3 years before she sought medical attention. She noted no other significant cognitive or behavioral problems; throughout the evaluation described she continued to drive in large, congested cities without incident, worked part-time preparing income tax returns, and successfully negotiated the full range of homemaking activities (e.g., shopping, cooking, cleaning).
When evaluated in our laboratory at the age of 62 years, findings on her neurologic examination were normal except for her mental status. She was able to touch body parts with her eyes closed that were touched by the examiner. Additionally, if a part of her body was touched, she was able to touch the corresponding spot on the examiner's body. Consistent with the clinical diagnosis of semantic dementia, her MRI revealed mild generalized atrophy as well as marked atrophy of the anterior temporal lobe on the left. Although most pronounced anteriorly, the left temporal atrophy was noted to extend to the posterior, superior temporal lobe as well ( figure) .
The patient showed a substantial semantic deficit. Details of her neuropsychological examination have been reported elsewhere. 17 In the present context, it should be noted that she was quite impaired in naming, responding correctly on only 26% of pictures on the Philadelphia Naming Test on July 2, 1999, and 13% 14 months later. She was severely impaired on a wide range of tests of semantics. For example, she obtained a score of 95 of 150 on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (1st percentile). She performed poorly on the Pyramids and Palm Trees test with word stimuli, responding correctly on only 28 of 52 trials. Like several other patients with semantic dementia, 18, 19 however, she performed substantially better with pictures, exhibiting a mild impairment, e.g., on the picture version of the Pyramids and Palm Trees test (46/52). This discrepancy in access to semantic information as a function of stimulus type was also observed when she was asked to provide information about the 175 items from the Philadelphia Naming Test. Blinded raters judged her responses to pictures to be significantly more specific and detailed than her responses to the names of the same items. The patient performed poorly on a variety of picture-to-word matching tasks; she was substantially but uniformly impaired on the Shallice/McGill task with abstract, concrete, and emotional words (16/30, 15/30, and 7/15). She had both a surface dyslexia and dysgraphia (see "Oral reading of body part names").
The patient performed well on a variety of nonsemantic tasks. She obtained perfect scores on the visuospatial subtests of the Visual Object and Space Perception Test 20 and performed normally on the Object Decision test but was somewhat impaired on the Silhouettes Identification (15/30; at the 5th percentile cut-off score). Performance on the latter may have been adversely affected by her anomia. She obtained a score of 42 of 50 on the Warrington forced choice memory for faces test (50th percentile) but scored only 30 of 50 on the comparable task with words (5th percentile).
Examination of her performance on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test and other tasks did not reveal differential performance on items from different semantic categories. For example, she responded correctly on five of 16 trials with human-made artifacts and four of 14 trials with living things. Preliminary observations suggested, however, that two domains of knowledge were preserved. First, the patient performed well with numbers; she named numerals and read and wrote number words more reliably than nouns matched for frequency and length. 21 Second, the patient performed quite well on a wide range of tasks assessing body representations. The assessment of body knowledge is described here.
Evidence for preserved body representations. We [14] [15] [16] 22 and others 23 have argued elsewhere that three distinct types of representations underlie our knowledge of the human body. One putative representation, for which we have suggested the term "body image," includes lexicalsemantic, propositional information about the human body including the names of body parts, the associations between body parts and artifacts, and the function of different body parts. This information is assumed to be linked to the verbal system and accessible to consciousness. A number of patients with disorders of the body image have been described; e.g., Dennis 24 reported on a patient who could reach to body parts touched by the examiner but could not name those body parts or point to a named body part. The Gerstmann syndrome 25 is assumed to reflect a disorder of this representation.
The "body structural description," a second type of body representation, provides information regarding the shape and contours of the surface of the human body. The local relationship between body parts is assumed to be represented by the body structural description.
14 Data in support of this level of representation come from a variety of sources, including the syndrome of autotopagnosia 14, 26 and from other patients who are able to reliably detect and describe but cannot localize stimuli. 16, 23 Finally, the third level of representation of body knowledge is the "body schema," a dynamic representation of the body in space that articulates with motor systems in the control of action; the "body schema" is assumed to provide an on-line representation of the body in space that is derived from multiple sensory inputs. 21 In contrast to the body image, disturbances of which may not have implications for the sensorimotor interactions with the environment, disruptions of the body schema are associated with substantial deficits in function. We have suggested, e.g., that disruptions of the body schema may, at least in part, underlie neglect of the body. 15 We have developed a battery of tests to assess these putative body representations. 16, 21 The tasks were administered to 18 right-handed normal subjects (mean age, 47 years; range, 25 to 68 years; 17 women, 1 man). The range of scores obtained by these subjects on each task is included in the table. The following tasks were administered to the patient.
Tests of the body image. Pointing to named body parts. The patient was asked to point to a named body part on two occasions. Targets were presented in conjunction with three foils: one was related by function, one by proximity on the body surface, and one bore no clear relationship to the target. For example, the foils for the target hand included pictures of a foot, forearm, and nose. There were 24 trials. The task was administered on two occasions approximately 1 year apart. The patient was perfect on both administrations.
In order to demonstrate that this represents a selective preservation of this semantic domain, the patient's perfor- Body parts (n ϭ 14) 86 71
Oral reading: body parts (n ϭ 25) 100 100
Body structural description Contiguity task (n ϭ 24) 100 88 71-100
Pointing to pictured body part on oneself (n ϭ 24) 100 100 88-100
Pointing to named body part on oneself (n ϭ 24) 100 100
Body schema
Hand laterality judgment (n ϭ 64) 98 98 68-100
PALPA ϭ Psycholinguistic Assessment of Language Processing in Aphasia; PNT ϭ Philadelphia Naming Test.
mance was assessed in two additional word-to-picture matching tasks involving other categories of stimuli. She obtained a score of 50% (8/16) on a word-to-picture matching task from the Philadelphia Comprehension Battery in which the target and foils were drawn from the same semantic category (e.g., fruits, animals, artifacts). As body parts are more frequent and of higher familiarity than the stimuli from the latter test, performance was compared on a subset of the items from the two word-topicture tasks for which familiarity and frequency ratings were available. Twelve body parts and eight non-body part stimuli matched for frequency 27 (53 Ϯ 40 versus 63 Ϯ 108; Fisher p ϭ 0.7477) and familiarity (571 Ϯ 37 versus 546 Ϯ 57 28 ; Fisher p ϭ 0.2439) were identified. The patient performed better with body parts (12/12) as compared with non-body part stimuli (4/8; Fisher p ϭ 0.0144).
Performance with body parts was also compared with Subtest 47 of the Psycholinguistic Assessment of Language Processing in Aphasia (PALPA 29 ), in which subjects are asked to point to one of five pictures from different semantic categories in response to a named word. As noted in the table, the patient responded correctly on 58% of trials. As the mean familiarity and frequency of the body parts exceeded that of the targets on the PALPA subtest, performance was again compared on a subset of the stimuli that were matched for frequency (53 Ϯ 40 versus 45 Ϯ 67 counts per million; Fisher p ϭ 0.7095) and familiarity (571 Ϯ 37 versus 550 Ϯ 35; Fisher p ϭ 0.1361). The patient performed better with body parts than with non-body part stimuli (12/12 versus 12/21; Fisher p ϭ 0.0299).
Body part and object association. The patient was shown a picture of an item of clothing and jewelry and asked to point to the body part with which the item would be associated. For example, on one trial, there was a picture of a watch as well as pictures of a wrist, ankle, waist, and neck. There were a total of 18 trials; there was no time limit. She performed normally on this task, making one error on the first administration and no errors on the subsequent administration.
Body parts: assessment of function. As noted here, lexical-semantic knowledge of the body, i.e., the body image, is thought to include information regarding the function of different body parts. To assess knowledge of the function of body parts, the patient was shown a picture of a body part and asked to point to the pictured body part that was most similar with respect to function. On one trial, e.g., a picture of a knee was presented and potential responses included a picture of the target (elbow), a contiguous body part (thigh), and an unrelated body part (lips). There were a total of 24 trials. She responded perfectly on two administrations of the task.
Naming body parts. The patient was asked to name 24 pictures of isolated body parts (e.g., the elbow with shoulder and hand cropped) presented individually. There was no time limit. As indicated in the table, she named 63 and 54% of body parts on different administrations 1 year apart. As 18 normal subjects correctly name an average of 94%, she is impaired on this task. We reasoned, however, that as the patient was profoundly anomic, responding correctly on only 14% of the 175 trials of the Philadelphia Naming Test, her impairment on this task may have been adversely affected by a postsemantic lexical retrieval deficit. To control for this possibility, her performance on the 14 items from the body part naming task for which frequency and familiarity ratings were available was compared with her naming of 28 items from the Philadelphia Naming Test matched to the body part names with respect to frequency (49 Ϯ 90 versus 51 Ϯ 99 counts per million 36) and familiarity (573 Ϯ 35 versus 573 Ϯ 323). She performed better with body parts as compared with nonbody parts on both occasions (12/14 versus 6/28 and 10/14 versus 2/28; both Fisher p Ͻ 0.0001). These data suggest that the patient's impairment in naming body parts is attributable to deficits in lexical selection or retrieval rather than to an impairment in body representations. Most errors were failures to respond. On nine trials she pointed on her own body to the pictured body part.
Oral reading of body part names. As previously noted, the patient has a surface dyslexia and dysgraphia. One account of surface dyslexia is that it reflects the operation of print-to-sound correspondence mechanisms in the absence of relevant semantic information. Per this view, we would expect to observe the regularization errors (reading of sew to rhyme with few) that characterize this disorder only when reading words for which semantic information is not available. Thus, if semantic information relevant to the body is preserved, we would not expect to observe surface dyslexic errors in the reading of these words. This prediction was tested by comparing her performance when reading aloud names of body parts and names of items from different semantic categories.
The patient was asked to read 25 body part names, including six items containing atypical print-to-sound correspondences (breast, eye, knee, wrist, shoulder, foot). She read all words correctly. Additionally, the patient was asked to read aloud six words with irregular correspondences (pretty, colonel, soul, break, pint, shoe) that were matched for frequency and familiarity. She correctly read only two of the irregular words. Despite the small number of items, there was a trend for performance to be better with body part names (Fisher p ϭ 0.061).
Assessment of the body structural description. Two tasks were administered to assess the integrity of the body structural description Contiguity task. A picture of a body part was presented and the patient was asked to pick from one of three pictured items the body part that would be contiguous with it, i.e., next to it on the surface of the body. Stimuli for this task were identical to those employed in the Function Task described previously. The trials were presented in a different order and the Contiguity and Function Tasks were not presented in the same session. There were 24 trials. The patient was perfect on this task in two administrations.
Pointing to pictured or named body part on oneself. The body structural description codes the local relationship between body parts. Patients with a deficit in this representation may be impaired in the localization of body parts on the body surface even when they are able to name the isolated body part. 26, 30 Our patient's ability to locate body parts on herself was assessed in two separate tasks. On one occasion, she was shown a picture of an isolated body part (e.g., knee); on another occasion the name of a body part was presented auditorily and she was asked to point to the named body part on her own body. There were 24 trials in each condition. The patient performed perfectly with both pictures and words.
Test of body schema. A large body of experimental evidence suggests that subjects distinguish between right and left hands by mentally rotating their hands to match the position of the pictured hand. 31 Data from normal 32 and subjects with brain lesions 15 suggest that the on-line, realtime representation of the body in space, i.e., the "body schema," is critical for this task. We employed a right/left hand discrimination task to assess the integrity of the patient's body schema. Pictures of either the right or left hand in the palm-up or palm-down condition were presented in one of four orientations: 0°, 90°, 180°, or 270°. On each trial, she was asked to indicate whether a right or left hand was presented. There were 64 trials. As indicated in the table, the patient performed extremely well on this task (98% for each hand), making fewer errors than most control subjects.
Discussion. The patient performed normally on a wide range of tasks assessing body representations. The tasks involved different input modalities (auditory, visual) and stimulus types (written words, spoken words, pictures). As she performed substantially less well with words as compared with pictures on a variety of tasks (see Saffran et al., in press), her good performance on the body representation tasks involving words demonstrates that her preserved ability cannot be attributed to a language deficit.
A second important point concerns the relationship between semantic knowledge and what we have argued are discrete types of body representations. It might be argued that at least some of the tasks described here assessing body representations pertain to cognitive processes that are not truly "semantic." For example, we have argued that the body structural description provides a representation of the body surface and dimensions; it is not clear that such a representation should be included in the acquired store of knowledge about the world that is typically assumed to constitute the domain of semantics. 1, 33 Similarly, the body schema, which we take to be an on-line representation of the body in space that articulates closely with the motor system in the genesis of action, would not be considered by all investigators to be a semantic representation. Thus, it might be argued that the patient's normal performance on these tasks speaks to the status of her body representations but not to her semantic knowledge.
The body image, in contrast, is that component of body knowledge that is available to verbal interrogation and that provides information regarding the name and function of body parts as well as the types of objects with which body parts are associated. This representation, we suggest, is appropriately characterized as "semantic" under all usages of the term. Thus, our patient's performance on the five tasks assessing the body image provides strong evidence that body semantics is preserved. In conjunction with the previously cited demonstrations that body image information may be selectively impaired 11 or preserved 12 in patients with brain lesions, these data argue strongly that body semantics should be considered a specific category of semantic knowledge. These data demonstrating a selective sparing of body representations in a patient with semantic dementia also speak to competing accounts of the architecture of the semantic system. We believe that the data are most readily accommodated by the hypothesis that semantic representations are distributed across multiple brain regions, reflecting the manner in which information relevant to that object or concept was acquired and elaborated. 10, 34 On this account, "category-specific" semantic deficits are assumed to emerge with brain lesions because the processing of the category in question is particularly dependent on the damaged brain module. Thus, e.g., on the "sensory/functional" account, 2, 8, 35 impairment in the naming, recognition, or categorization of animals is assumed to reflect the fact that for most individuals knowledge of animals is largely derived from visual and other sensory modalities. Similarly, a deficit in the comprehension of human-made artifacts 3,7 is assumed to reflect the fact that knowledge of these items is acquired by virtue of motor (i.e., manipulation 36 ) as well as sensory interactions. On the sensory/functional as well as related accounts (e.g., 34, 36 ), category-specific effects are attributed to differential weighting of sensorimotor processes in the semantic representation of an object or concept rather than category membership per se.
How would such an account accommodate the data demonstrating that body knowledge represents a dissociable semantic category? We suggest that body representations, including body semantics, develop by virtue of the countless actions an individual directs toward objects in the environment as well as his or her own body (i.e., reaching to pick up a grape and then bringing it to the mouth). As we and others have suggested previously, 16, [37] [38] [39] both types of actions are guided by dynamic representations of the current and planned positions of body parts relative to one another as specified by somatosensory information indicating joint angles or limb orientations (i.e., a component of the body schema termed "intrinsic egocentric coding"). Such dynamic representations of the body derived from visual and somatosensory information are refined over the course of innumerable actions, presumably involving a procedure that involves the detection and correction of mismatches between planned and executed movements. Body "semantics," or what has been termed here the "body image," represents the mapping between language (and other knowledge representations) and the knowledge of body configuration and biomechanics derived from sensorimotor interactions with the environment. Thus, per this account, typical tests of body semantics such as naming body parts or pointing to named body parts require the linking of lexical information to the representations that we have termed the "body schema" and "body structural description." As these representations of the human body are not dependent on the sensory properties, manner of manipulation, or encyclopedic (propositional) knowledge of animals, plants, artifacts, or any other type of object, body semantics represents an independent semantic domain. The fact that body semantics may be selectively spared (as in our patient) or impaired is a consequence of this independence.
We note that the "sensory/functional" account of the performance of the patient of Shelton et al. 12 was rejected, in part because it was not clear whether "body semantics" was to be considered critically dependent on "functional/associative" or "sensory" knowledge. 12 We suggest that this criticism may be germane to a narrow construction of the "sensory/functional" hypothesis but is not relevant to alternative accounts of semantic processing incorporating knowledge representations distributed across multiple domains.
10,40 Allport's model 34 of the semantic system proposes that the "semantic representation" of an object or concept includes encyclopedic or propositional information, multiple distinct sensory (tactile, olfactory, vestibular, and auditory) representations in addition to kinesthetic/ motor representations. Such an account, which we believe accommodates the data from our patient as well as IOC, differs from the "sensory/functional" account 2, 8, 35 in that it distinguishes between at least two distinct notions that appear to be conflated in the term "function." One concerns the motor aspects of an object or concept, i.e., the manner in which an object is manipulated 36 or the motor/kinesthetic knowledge that distinguishes the concepts "jog" and "lope." A second aspect of "function" is more abstract and includes knowledge of the role an object might play in the world. For example, we suggest that the knowledge of the manner in which a hammer is used to drive a nail, which is coded with respect to action, is fundamentally different from the propositional knowledge that a hammer is used to drive a nail but not a screw.
The data from our patient also speak to the question of the anatomic basis of semantic knowledge of the body. From Munk's 41 observations that parietal lesions in dogs appear to disrupt an animal's knowledge of the body in space, a variety of lines of evidence have been reported that are consistent with the claim that the parietal lobes support knowledge of the human body. For example, the syndrome of "finger agnosia" 25 is typically associated with lesions of the dominant inferior parietal lobule. Similarly, autotopagnosia, a disorder that we have attributed to impairment in the body structural description, is also associated with dominant parietal lobe lesions. 26 Finally, the data from patients exhibiting sparing and disruption of body knowledge briefly described here are consistent with the claim that the dominant parietal lobe is critical for body knowledge. The dominant parietal lobe has been spared in patients with preservation of body knowledge (e.g., our patient), 2, 12, 35 whereas this structure appears to have been disrupted in most patients with deficits involving body knowledge. 11 The association between deficits in body semantics and parietal lesions is not universal, however; impaired naming and comprehension of body parts have been reported in patients with lesions sparing the parietal lobe. 7, 24 Data from functional imaging investigations are also consistent with this claim. Several investigators have reported data demonstrating that the mental rotation of the body, a task that we believe requires the body schema, is associated with activation in the posterior parietal cortex 32, 42, 43 as well as lateral frontal lobe. Additionally, Le Clec'h et al. 44 have recently reported data from an fMRI investigation in which subjects were presented with written or spoken body part names and asked to indicate whether the body part was above or below the shoulders. Activation was observed in the left precentral gyrus, mesial prefrontal cortex, and intraparietal sulcus, all on the left.
